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The Marouini River Tract And Its 
Colonial Legacy in South America 
 




In perhaps the most desolate and under-populated area in the South America lies one of the most 
lingering boundary conflicts of modern nations.  Suriname and French Guiana (an overseas colony of 
France) dispute which of the upper tributaries of the Maroni River1 was originally intended to form the 
southern extension of their border.  The Maroni River exists as the northern boundary between the two 
bordering nations on the Caribbean coast, and was intended to serve as the boundary to the Brazilian 
border.2  The disputed area, deemed the Marouini River Tract,3 is today administered by France under the 
Overseas Department.  Most modern maps, except those produced by Suriname, indicate that the land is a 
possession of French Guiana. However, Suriname claims that it has always been the rightful owner of the 
region and that France should relinquish it to them.  
The territory covers approximately 5,000 square miles of inland Amazon forest and apparently 
contains significant bauxite, gold, and diamond resources and potential hydroelectric production.  The area 
has remained undeveloped and subject to dispute for over 300 years.  It has received scant international 
attention. And today it remains one of many borders in the Guianas that has resisted solution. 4   It is a 
continuous reminder of the troubled colonial legacy in Latin America and the Caribbean.   
 This paper will describe the historical roots of the dispute, the different claims over time, and the 
legal precedents to support such claims.  The paper will indicate that French Guiana would be more likely 
to perfect title to the Marouini River Tract if the issue were ever referred to an international tribunal. Its 
                                                 
! B.A., M.A., American University; J.D. New York Law School; Intensive Arabic Institute, American 
University in Cairo.   All Dutch Translations are done by the author and should not be used as authoritative.  
The author may be reached at tomdonovan@hotmail.com.  
 
1 The Marouini River should not be confused with the Maroni River.  The Marouini River is Suriname’s 
claim for its southeastern boundary with French Guiana.  The Maroni River is used to describe the northern 
boundary on the Caribbean coast, which is often labeled the “Marowijne River.”  Ivan Sanderson, A 




3 The Marouini River Tract has also been labeled the “Marouini River Triangle,” or the “Itany-Marouini 
Triangle.”  For purposes of this paper, the Marouini River Tract is defined as the area between the Itany 
and Marouini Rivers, bordered on the South by Brazil. 
 
4 For a more complete discussion of the other border disputes in the Guianas see Thomas W. Donovan, 
Challenges to the Territorial Integrity of Guyana: A Legal Analysis, GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. (Spring 
2004); Thomas W. Donovan, Suriname-Guyana Maritime and Territorial Disputes: A Legal and Historical 
Analysis, 13 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 41, 41-98 (2003).  
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primary argument would be that it has maintained effective occupation that has been clear and consistent 
throughout the last two hundred years.  French Guiana has controlled and policed the area for most of this 
time, and has even been effective in defending it from Dutch and later Surinamese incursions.  Moreover, 
Suriname, as well as its previous colonial state of Dutch Guiana, effectively relied on the French 
occupation of Marouini River Tract to fortify its southeastern border and has acquiesced, as defined in 
international law, to French control of the area. 
 In order to persuade any international tribunal that Suriname has the right to this territory, it may 
utilize such legal mechanisms as possible prescription, colonial hinterland claims, and inherited colonial 
claims. It can claim that Dutch subjects were the original inhabitants of the area, and that their descendents 
have lived there continuously. Suriname can then assert that it inherited all the claims of their Dutch 
colonial predecessors and thus remains possessor of the territory under uti possidetis juris.   However, none 
of these legal theories are able to defeat the clear and consistent showing of effective occupation by French 
Guiana.   
 






A. Geographical Considerations 
The land in dispute is the territory between the Itany5 and Marouini Rivers.6  The area lies at the 
southwestern corner of French Guiana, or the southeast corner of Suriname.  France claims its southwestern 
border is the Itany River, which flows northward from a watershed in Northern Brazil and empties into the 
Lawa River.7  Suriname, on the other hand, claims the Marouini River, which parallels the Northern flow of 
the Itany River, but lies nearly 100 miles eastwards.  It is the area between these two river systems that 
forms the modern boundary question.  The southern section of the disputed territory forms the northern 
border of Brazil, which is not disputed by any of the three countries. 
 The area consists of dense forests with few roads and little human inhabitation.  No census has 
been undertaken by either country to determine its exact population.  Most of the inhabitants work as 
seasonal miners and “banta bleeders” (people who extract the natural latex from the rubber tree). They 
move through the unfortified boundary area freely.  There is also significant drug trafficking in the 
territory.  The area is used for the cultivation of drug producing plants as well as for concealing and 
smuggling processed and unprocessed drugs. 8 
 
 
 B. Economic Activity in Disputed Areas 
 
Even though no systemic survey has ever been accomplished to determine the extent of its 
resources, the territory is believed to contain significant natural resources.  Perhaps the most noted are the 
gold deposits which were discovered the mid Nineteenth Century by French prospectors.  This led to the 
first “gold rush,” if it is to be labeled as such, in the area.9   
There is also evidence of significant aluminum and bauxite deposits.10  In 1984, SURALCO, a 
subsidiary of the Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), formed a joint venture with the Royal Dutch 
                                                 
5 The Itany River is sometimes labeled the “Litany River” on maps.  A consistent spelling of 
“Itany River” is used to describe France’s claim for the southwest corner of French Guiana. 
 
6 See Sanderson, supra note 1, at 1. 
 
7 The Lawa River forms the boundary between Suriname and French Guiana in the middle 
area between the Caribbean headwaters and the southern extension which is the disputed 
Marouini – Itany River.  Although some maps label this map various names, a consistent use 
of “The Lawa River” will be used to describe the boundary between the confluence of the 
Tapanhoni River and the confluence of the Itany – Marouini Rivers. 
 
8 The CIA World Factbook.  Available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ns.html (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2004). 
 
9 Engel Sluiter, Dutch Guiana: A Problem in Boundaries, HISP. AM. HISTORICAL REV, Feb. 1933, at 7. 
 
10 Aluminum exports accounted for 70% of Suriname's estimated $485 million export earnings in 2000.  
Szczesniak, supra note 8.  See also Debra A. Klein, A Cultural Mix in a Lush Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
26, 2003, at Section 5, page 10. 
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Shell-owned Billiton Company to explore the interior of Suriname.11  The survey did not reveal the exact 
locations of bauxite deposits, but noted the entire Suriname interior, including the disputed territory, 
appeared to have viable amounts of bauxite.12  The large Marouini and Itany Rivers also have virtually 
unlimited hydroelectric capacity.  Both nations would benefit economically and socially if these resources 
could be exploited.  
 
III. Origins and Progression of the Dispute   
 
The historical basis for the boundary dispute lies in the colonial history of the Guianas where 
European enterprises entrenched themselves with little regard to the exact location of boundaries of their 
colonies.13  This section will discuss the relevant indigenous inhabitation, colonial history of the dispute, 
and modern overtures towards demarcation.  
 
A. Indigenous Inhabitants 
The earliest inhabitants of the general area were the Carib Indians, whose range was the Amazon River 
valley and the Guiana lowlands to the islands of the Sea that bears their name.14  Most of the Carib died 
from disease and warfare with the Spanish in the 1500s, and have left few traces of their existence in the 
area.  Largest of the other Amerindian groups were the Arawak Indians.  More peaceful than the Caribs, 
their numbers were decimated by disease rather than war when the Spanish arrived. A third group, the 
Maroons, were the African slaves who escaped captivity after being brought to the area by Europeans.  
Many sought refuge in the forests of the southern Guianas where many of their descendents continue to 
live.  Many Maroons and indigenous Indians have co-mingled and their offspring have created a separate 
and distinguishable culture.15  Today the number of Maroons and Amerindians living in the southern 
                                                                                                                               
 
11 Donovan, supra note 4, at 46.  SURALCO is a dependant corporation of ALCOA but with state owned 
branches. Id. 
 
12 Id.  
 
13 Thomas W. Donovan, Jurisdictional Relationships Between Nations and Their Former Colonies. 1 
ACROSS BORDERS INT’L L. J. 5 (2003), at http://www.across-borders.com.  A colony was usually the legal 
extension of the home country.  In the Guiana experience, however, many of the colonies were established, 
maintained, and funded by state run corporations such as the Dutch West Indies Corporation instead of a 
traditional state ministry.  This will be discussed infra, as it pertains to the legal status of the trust territories 
of the Netherlands and France.  See id. 
 
14 The Organization of American States (OAS), Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/89.90eng/toc.htm (May 17, 1990).  
Although the Maroons were the first inhabitants, the Government of Suriname has reportedly violated 
property and human rights of the small tribes that live in the New River Triangle.  Id. 
 
15 Garry D. Peterson & Marieke Heemskerk, Deforestation and Forest Regeneration Following Small-Scale 
Gold Mining in the Amazon: The Case of Suriname, ENVTL. CONSERVATION, June 2001, at 117-126. 
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French Guiana-Suriname area are estimated at about 5,000, and most of them enter the disputed area only 
seasonally for prospecting.16   
 
 B. Early Colonial History 
The area that is today French Guiana was discovered in 1496 by the Spanish, who established a 
few settlements in 1503 and 1504.17  Long after the Spanish had abandoned these communities, the Dutch 
moved in and established settlements along  the coast.18  They endured rampant disease, floods, and the 
disruptions brought about by the European wars between England, Holland, and France. 19  Under the 1667 
Treaty of Breda, the Dutch, were forced to relinquish their claim and plantations and were expelled.20 The 
Dutch trade concerns returned in the early 1700s and established new farming and shipping settlements in 
what is now the modern day Suriname - French Guiana Caribbean boundary area.21 
The first organized and viable settlement of the disputed Marouini River Tract began in the late 
1700s.  The King of France ‘granted’ a group of French colonists the land between the coastal city of 
Kouro and the Maroni River in 1,600 acre parceled grants.22  Records indicate that this colonial experiment 
did not last, and most of the chartered Europeans abandoned their attempts to settle the interior and 
returned to the larger cities of French Guiana, Cayenne and Kouro. 23  However, this record provides 
evidence of the French Government’s intent to claim the area for France, and to occupy it with French 
colonialists. 
                                                                                                                               
 
16 Id. at 117-126.  For a description of the indigenous people in the area, see 
http://www.si.edu/maroon/foodways/guiana.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). 
 
17 VERE T. DALY, THE MAKING OF GUYANA 35-37 (1974).  Daly asserts that the first European inhabitants 
of the Guianas did not venture inland because of health concerns and poor transportation abilities.  During 
this era the coast was cultivated to produce tobacco and sugar which were the most important commodities 
at the time.  Id. at 35-37, 46. 
 
18 The colonial experiences in the Guianas involved the English, Dutch and French.  Sir Walter Raleigh.  
The Discoverie of the Large, Rich and Bewtiful Empyre of Guiana.  (Neil L. Whitehead ed.) 1998.  First 
printed in 1596.  (University of Oklahoma Press). 
 
19 CORNELIUS CH. GOSLINGA, THE DUTCH IN THE CARIBBEAN AND ON THE WILD COAST 1580-1680, 34, 430 
(1971).  
 
20 The 1667 Treaty of Breda (also called Peace of Breda) ended the Second Anglo-Dutch war.  “By this 
treaty the Dutch Republic’s possession of islands in the West Indies and of Suriname was confirmed, while 
the Dutch gave up their possessions in what is now New York and New Jersey.”  Benjamin Hunnigher, 
Breda, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 494 (1998). 
 
21 Goslinga, supra note 19, at 35.   
 
22 David Lowenthal, Colonial Experiments in the Guiana, HISP. AM. HISTORICAL REV., Feb. 1952, at 28. 
 
23 Id. at 28-29. 
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Not until the latter half of the Seventeenth Century were the borders of the interior explored for 
the first time.24  The Dutch argued that the Sinamary River,25 which lies in the center of modern French 
Guiana, was their far Eastern border.   Had this border been accepted by the French, modern day French 
Guiana would be denied nearly 50 percent of its territory.  This ambitious claim was based on the fact that 
Dutch traders and slave drivers ventured periodically into the region either in search of escaped slaves or 
new markets for the Suriname’s plantation products.  Records of the Dutch West Indies Corporation 
indicate that it effectively administered the area to the west bank of the Maroni River, and dealt with its 
inhabitants through trade and commerce.26   
Existence of trade routes were not the only facts used by the Dutch to justify its claims on territory 
east of the Maroni River. Early documents also indicated Dutch hegemony over the area.  The most 
persuasive example of this was the original English grant of land by King Charles II to Lord Willoughby 
which “expressly stated that the colony of Surinam (at the time in the English hands) had expanded to the 
right bank of the Marowijne (Maroni).” 27 
The original grants and early claims, however, seemed to have been ignored.  The realities of 
actual occupation took precedence over the views of European monarchs. Records indicate that over the 
course of the Seventeenth Century the Maroni River eventually came to be generally regarded as the 
eastern boundary of Dutch Guiana.28  This occurred for the most part because the Dutch had tacitly 
permitted the French to build commercial structures and military outposts on the right bank of the river.  
The Dutch allowed this French encroachment as an additional means of preventing slaves from escaping.29  
The failure of the Dutch to object or contest the French occupation suggests that they did not themselves 
plan to occupy the territory east of the Maroni River at the time.30   
In 1836, the Dutch and French Governments agreed to settle their common border.  They first 
determined that the Maroni River would divide their colonies from the Caribbean-Atlantic Ocean to its 
origin in the mountains at the Brazilian border.31  The question they had not yet answered when they made 
                                                 
24 See generally Vincent T. Harlow (ed.) Colonizing Expeditions to the West Indies and Guiana, 1623-
1667.  Halkluyt Society Work Series.  No. 2, Vol. 56.  Kraus International Publications. 
 
25 Other spellings of the Sinamary River have been used in the past such as the “Sinnamarie River” or 
“Sinnamary River.”  Throughout this paper a consistent spelling of Sinamary will be used. 
 




28 Sanderson, supra note 1, at 472.  
 
29 RICHARD PRICE, THE GUIANA MAROONS: THE HISTORICAL AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION 
(1976). 
 
30 Sluiter, supra note 5, at 6. 
 
31 Raye R. Platt, Present Status of International Boundaries in South America, GEOGRAPHICAL REV, Oct. 
1924, at 627. 
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this decision was, ‘where exactly does this river originate?   Many rivers joined along this route and it was 
necessary to decide which of them was the main tributary of the Maroni.  After lengthy debate, the 
commission disbanded when it remained unable to decide whether the Maroni came primarily from the 
Tapahoni in the west, or the Lawa River in the east.32  
A few years later gold was discovered in the Marouini River Tract.  Both nations renewed their 
eagerness to demarcate the territory so they could begin development of the area.33  The Dutch had more 
experience in the interior stemming from their frequent slave problems. Throughout the Eighteenth Century 
slave revolts and escapes compelled the Dutch to venture frequently into the territory to retrieve them.  To 
facilitate this, the Dutch established military outposts deep in the interior and exercised acts of sovereignty 
in the disputed interior.   
 The runaway slaves would invariably seek refuge and cover in the deep forests of the Northern 
Amazon. Throughout the early history of Dutch Guiana there are numerous accounts of military excursions 
into the area searching for escaped plantation slaves, now called Maroons. 34 The most notable escapee was 
the slave leader, Koffie, after whom the village of Koffiekamp, is named.35  The slave escapes and their 
subsequent settlement in the area provide the most compelling argument for Suriname’s predecessor, Dutch 
Guiana, to have control over the Marouini River Tract.  Besides arguing that it occupied the area, Dutch 
Guiana also asserted the only inhabitants of the territory in dispute were the Maroons, the descendants of 
escaped slaves belonging to Surinamese plantations.  Since the implied right to exercise sovereignty over 
these people had never been relinquished by the Dutch Government, a claim to the interior which the 
Maroons inhabited could therefore be sustained.36  Effective occupation, it was argued, was demonstrated 
by the Dutch military posts which dotted the interior.  The Dutch further argued that it was not that 
important which rivers were the main tributaries of the Maroni.  More important was the fact that the area 
was inhabited by the Maroons, who were subjects of the Dutch nation.37   
Despite the arguments from the Dutch homeland, Dutch Guianese settlers agreed with their French 
Guianese counterparts that a clear border had to be determined.  So, in 1861 a group of colonists and local 




33 ALLEN MARK FLETCHER, THE LAND AND PEOPLE OF THE GUIANAS (Revised ed. 1972). 
 
34 Donovan, supra note 4, at 48.  Escaped slaves and slave rebellions plagued economic development in the 
Dutch colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
 
35 See http://spac.cq-link.sr/SBN/SBN-news.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). 
 
36 WIM S. M. HOOGBERGEN, THE BONI MAROON WARS IN SURINAME (1997).   
37In the Peace Treaty of Badajoz (June 6, 1801) and Peace Treaty of Madrid September 29 (1801), 
Portugal, militarily and diplomatically weak, is forced to sign these treaties, by which Brazil accepted 
French demands for the river Arawani to form Guiana's borders with Brazil. See 
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/2382/brevhisi.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). 
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government officials from both colonies attempted to establish which rivers were the major tributaries, and 
finally demarcate the boundary.38  They explored the Maroni River upstream until they reached the 
confluence of two rivers almost identical in size and volume, the Tapanhoni and Lawa Rivers.  After 
measuring the comparative width of the entering streams and taking varying depth measurements, the 
commission finally concluded it was the Lawa that was the greater tributary.   
The colonists of the 1861 mixed commission presented their findings to their respective parent 
countries expecting that soon a final agreement would be reached.  However, neither France nor Holland 
wanted to follow the colonists’ recommendations, and work to establish a formal treaty was abandoned.   It 
was understood that the intent of a government to gain title to a particular area must be through objective, 
state controlled interests, not private decisions.  Since both territories were colonies of rival European 
powers, decisions had to come from the parent country rather than the colonists.39  Since the colonies were 
not independent, it would not be correct to impute the intent of the colonialists onto the government.40   
In 1874 additional gold discoveries in the Marouini River Tract began a larger and more organized 
gold rush to the area.41  The Dutch felt that their rights were being infringed upon by the presence of the 
French, while the home government in Paris showed little interest in demarcating the border.42  Taking the 
initiative, the Dutch government suggested the dispute be arbitrated by a neutral judge whose decision was 
to be final.  The arbitrator agreed upon was Czar Alexander III of Russia who accepted the responsibility to 
decide the case.43  In May 1891, he returned a verdict in favor of the Dutch, stating: 
 
                                                 
38 Sluiter, supra note 5, at 7. 
 
39 Because the colonial encampment was an extension of the home country, European methods of 
government and state control the intent of the country.  The conduct of private individuals, although 
persuasive as to show the effective control at a certain time and relevant as to the socio-economic ties 
which might be evident, are irrelevant as to determine the intentions of a state during colonialism.  See 




41 Sluiter, supra note 5, at 9. 
 
42 Sluiter, supra note 5, at 10. 
 
43 It was customary among colonial countries to refer inter-European disputes to detached neutral 
arbitrators who could rule on the issue.  It was also customary to refer to another country (as seen in the 
1899Venezuela - British Guiana instance where the American Government acted as panel to decide the 
Essequibo region of Western Guyana/Eastern Venezuela).  See Donovan, supra note 4, at 35.  Likewise 
other European sovereigns such as kings were used (as seen in the 1904 Dutch Guiana -Brazil arbitration 
over the Southern border of Dutch Guiana which was referred to King Vittore Emanuelle, III of Italy for 
arbitration.  See SURYA P. SHARMA, TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION, DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1997).  “The international agreement of May 5, 1906 (signed in Rio de Janeiro, approved by the law of 
July 11, 1908, and ratified on September 15, 1908, in The Hague), established the boundary between 
Suriname and the Federal Republic of Brazil.”  Suriname, Regional Location and Boundaries, at 
http://home.student.uva.nl/selwijn.pengel/boundaries.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2003). 
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That the Dutch government, according to well established facts not denied by 
the French Government, had already by the end of the previous [eighteenth] 
century established by military posts on the Lawa.  That the French authorities 
in Guiana have often acknowledged that the negroes residing in the disputed 
area directly or indirectly were subject to the Dutch Government; and that the 
French authorities did not enter into treaty relationships with the inland tribes 
living there except by means of the mediation, and in their presence, of a 
representative of the Dutch Government. 
 
That beyond contradiction it has been determined by both the interested powers 
that the (Maroni) River from its source must be taken as the boundary by their 
respective colonies.   
 
That the mixed commission of 1861 had collected evidence in favor of 
recognizing the Lawa as the superior stream of the upper (Maroni) on these 
grounds: 
 
(1) We declare that the Lawa must be considered as the boundary between the 
two possessions. 
(2) As a result of this decision the territory above the confluence of the Lawa 
and the Tapanhoni must be considered henceforth to belong to the Dutch 
however without infringing on the bona fide rights previously obtained by the 
French nationals on the territory which was in dispute.44 
 
Alexander’s declaration settled only part of the dispute.  As he indicated, the Lawa River was to 
be the definitive boundary.  Unfortunately, the merging of two tributaries of nearly equal size, the Itany, in 
the west, and the Marouini to the east forms the Lawa River upstream.  The dispute remained unresolved 
over the question of which of these rivers is to be considered the main progenitor of the Lawa, and thus the 
upstream border.  Although Alexander cited the findings of the 1861 mixed commission to establish that 
the Lawa was the superior tributary, he did not use their findings to settle the Itany-Marouini issue.  Had he 
done so, there probably would not now be a dispute.  Perhaps he did not do so because the work of the 
commission had a glaring deficiency.  The commissioners measured the Itany to its source to determine if it 
deserved to become the border river.45  However, they did not measure, or even explore, the Marouini.   
The commissioners reported that the Itany is usually larger than the Marouini.  Depending on the 
flow of each particular rainy season, they concluded, the Itany is wider and deeper than the Marouini, and 
on average feeds greater water volume into the Lawa.46  This is a rebuttable presumption, for the mixed 
commission of 1861 did not actually ascend the Marouini River.  They were therefore in no position to 
comment accurately about its strength or flow.   
                                                 
44 Sluiter, supra note 5, at 9. 
 
45 Sluiter, supra note 9, at 9. 
 
46 See http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/register/tables/IRB_footnotes.html (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2004). 
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The Marouini River was not formally surveyed until 1888 when Henri Condreau, a noted French 
explorer in South America, published an account of his journey.  He indicated nothing that could resolve 
the controversy of whether the Itany or Marouini River systems were larger.  Following publication of this 
work, Dutch boundary commissioners reverted to their earlier argument that it didn’t matter about the 
rivers as long as Dutch subjects (the runaway slaves) now were the only significant inhabitants of the area.    
They pointed out the fact, which Condreau acknowledged, that the colonies of Maroons, the ‘Boninegers,’47 
had lived along the Marouini River as early as 1790.48  Since the Czar in 1891 had agreed these peoples 
were Dutch subjects and their homes were on Dutch territory, by the same reasoning the Marouini River 
Tract, could be considered Dutch territory.49   
 Another boundary issue that should have been addressed at the time, but was not, pertained to the 
ownership of the islands in the Maroni River.  If the Maroni were to be the boundary, who was entitled to 
the islands on that River?  Usually such issues are determined by establishing the thalweg (the deep water 
mark of the boundary river) and awarding the land on each side of that mark accordingly.  However, the 
Maroni River has a tendency to change course, move soil around, build its own natural dams, and rise and 
fall with each season.  It was practically impossible to establish a permanent line where the impermanent 
thalweg was located.  Given this fact, there was no method recognized in international law whereby the 
exclusive ownership of these islands could be determined except by a treaty based on mutual compromise.  
Such a treaty was finally concluded at Paris September 30, 1915 between the Dutch Minister De 
Steurs, and the French Foreign Minister Déclassé.  The treaty was limited to the islands in the Maroni  
River between the northern point of Stoelman’s Island (Dutch) and the Southern extremity of Portal Island 
(French).  It provided that (1) a line in the middle of the river (at normal flow) should mark the boundary 
(thalweg); (2) islands entirely or largely to the west of this line should be Dutch while those entirely or 
largely to the East of this line should be French; (3) navigation on the river should be free to both nations; 
and (4) gold dredging permits were to be granted by mutual consent.50  Once again, this treaty did not 
address or define whether the Itany or the Marouini River were to be considered the southern extension of 
the border to Brazil.   
In 1902, the Dutch colonial Government undertook the construction of a railroad to the Lawa 
District.  It took five years to complete 120 kilometers and another five to connect the district with the 
capitol.  That same year, L.A. Bakhuis, a Dutch geographer, called attention to the publication of a French 
                                                 
47 Boninegers is a Dutch term used to describe the inhabitants of the interior.  See 
http://www.suriname.nu/distrikt/sipa.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2004). 
  
48 Sluiter, supra note 5, at 9-10. 
 
49 Donovan, supra note 4, at 48.  The later part of the nineteenth century saw a pressing drive to solidify 
borders in the Guianas.  This is highlighted by the 1899 Arbitration between British Guiana and Venezuela 
where the United States acted as arbitrator.  However, the colonial legacy and the difficult geography make 
boundary demarcations in the Guianas difficult. Id. 
 
50 Sluiter, supra note 9, at 9-10. 
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map by the firm of Erhard Freres at Paris, on which the cartographer, Maurice Goffroy, depicted the Itany, 
rather than the Marouini, as French Guiana’s southwestern boundary.  This was contrary to Suriname’s 
land surveyor, W.L. Loth, who indicated on Dutch maps the Marouini as Dutch Guiana’s southeastern 
boundary.   
In 1911, the matter drew attention in the second chamber of the Dutch Parliament.  A member 
(Van Doorn) urged that all of Dutch Guiana’s boundary disputes be resolved.  The Dutch colonial minister 
answered that diplomatic negotiations with France on this subject were in progress.  But after two years, the 
Dutch Foreign Minister reported that his offer to make a treaty with France was getting nowhere.51  Both 
nations failed to settle, or even to give settlement negotiations priority. Eventually, as it became apparent 
that gold production in the area was decreasing, so too was the amount of attention paid to the boundary 
issue.    
The boundary issue has not been dealt with since.  Only a few overtures to resume discussions 
have been offered by both Suriname (after independence in 1975 from The Netherlands) and the French 
Government.  But no substantive talks have been authorized.  Throughout the Twentieth Century nearly all 
sources indicate that French Guiana is administering the disputed area.52 Today, the world community and 
most of its mapmakers depict the Marouini River Tract as French sovereign territory.53  
 
IV. Legal Principles Applied to the Marouni Dispute    
 
The following section describes the operative legal principles that Suriname and French Guiana 
could use to justify their respective claims for the Marouini River Tract.  French Guiana will likely argue 
that they have consistently and effectively occupied the area, creating title through either occupation or 
prescription (adverse possession).  Suriname, on the other hand, will likely counter these arguments by 
pointing out that the inhabitants of the area were of Dutch Guiana descent and therefore Dutch Guiana 
created acts of occupation in the area.  And, even though French Guiana might have administered the area 
in recent years, Suriname could have gained title to the territory.  It could have done so through either 
adverse possession or a colonial hinterland claim which would be inherited by the successor state of Dutch 
Guiana or Suriname through uti possidetis juris. 
 
A. Determining Title Through The Law of Occupation  
 
                                                 
51 Throughout the Twentieth Century most maps of the area depict the French-Dutch boundary along the 
Itany, the western branch of the Lawa, and not along the Marouni River.  Id. 
 
52 See The Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook 2003 Edition.  
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/fg.html (last visited on Jan. 14, 2004). 
 
53 EDWARD M. DEW, THE TROUBLE IN SURINAME 1975-1993 (1975). 
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Gaining title to the Marouini River tract will hinge largely upon each disputant’s demonstration of its 
effective control of the area during the colonial era.  International law sets forth two requirements for creating 
sovereignty and control over sections of unoccupied land, animus domini (intent to control a territory) and 
animus corpus (actual control of a territory).54  These elements were originally delineated in the Arbitral Award 
between Brazil and Dutch Guiana in 1904.55  The arbitration award stated that “in order to acquire sovereignty 
over territory which is not under the control of any state, a state must intend to control the territory, and this 
intent must be accompanied by effective, uninterrupted, and permanent possession of the territory.”56 
The intent element could be established by the colonial entity, as the colonial protectorates were viewed as 
extensions of the state during this era.  According to Article 34 of the 1885 Treaty of Berlin, “the state intending 
to assume a protectorate is obliged to notify the other powers signatory to the act that it is has undertaken a 
protectorate over the country named; but, aside from such notification, the protectorate must become 
effective.”57 
Sustaining an intent claim requires a strict review of overt actions conducted by the ruling governmental 
authority.58 The seminal case on this point is Eastern Greenland.  The Permanent Court of International Justice 
held that in sparsely populated and desolate areas, intent could be as simple as reiterating in public a basic intent 
to control the territory.59  The court further noted that consistent inhabitation and comprehensive creation of 
public services were not needed to sustain the intent element.    However, for the claim to have weight, any 
public services rendered, even sporadically, would have to be those that only a state entity could perform.  The 
existence of a state entity could be established through such things as a military occupation or outpost (as seen in 
Clipperton Island),60 state owned and operated commercial businesses (such as the Dutch East Indies 
                                                 
54 Animus domini is also referred to as animus occupandi.  Consistent throughout this paper 
intent will be used to describe this element.  MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th 
ed. 1997). 
 
55 This dispute was referred to King Vittore Emanuelle III of Italy for arbitration.  The colonies of Portugal 
and Spain were gaining independence throughout South America and there were no uninvolved arbitrators 
to refer disputes.  Once Brazil emerged from colonialism, it attempted to ratify its borders, which included 
its northern border with Dutch Guiana.  The international agreement of May 5, 1906 (signed in Rio de 
Janeiro, approved by the law of July 11,1908, and ratified on September 15, 1908, in The Hague), 
established the boundary between Suriname and the Federal Republic of Brazil. 
 
56 Sharma, supra note 43, at 71. 
 
57 Article 34 of the Treaty of Berlin, cited in PASQUAL FIORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 431 (1929).  Jurists in 
the colonial era were consistent in asserting that a properly established colony or protectorate could acquire 
territory for the colonial sovereign.  Theodore Woolsey writes that “title is derived by immemorial 
occupation of land which was before vacant and by occupation of colonies is then occupied.”  THEODORE 
DWIGHT WOOLSEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (1981). 
 
58 For a general discussion see Shaw, supra note 54. 
 
59 See Eastern Greenland Case (Denmark v Norway) 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 48. 
 
60 Clipperton Island Award.  26 A. J. INT’L L. 390 (1932).  Clipperton concerned a dispute between France 
and Mexico over an uninhabited island.  The arbitrator emphasized the nominal acts which translated 
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Corporation (as in Island of Palmas)), or in public proclamations through a ruling government-affiliated ministry 
(as in Eastern Greenland).61   
The second element, known as animus corpus, is necessary to complete a claim of title over a given 
territory.  Arbitral panels have reviewed animus corpus much more extensively than the intent element.62  The 
controlling and fundamental law came through the Island of Palmas award in which control of a sparsely 
populated island in the Pacific was disputed between the United States and The Netherlands.  The United States 
based its claim on continuity of title (citing the U.S. rule over the Philippines). Because of this continuous 
transfer of title, the United States claimed, it was unnecessary to prove any further displays of sovereignty.  
Conversely, The Netherlands asserted that its predecessor in interest, the Dutch East Indian Company, 
maintained continuous occupation since 1677.  This gave The Netherlands a more justifiable claim to the island, 
they asserted.63   
“Occupation” was defined by the Swiss Judge Max Huber in granting the Award to the Netherlands, as the 
actual display of state activities that can only be performed by a territorial sovereign.64 Judge Huber added that 
there was a different test of corpus in the instances of distant, uninhabited territories.65   As he stated, 
“manifestations of sovereignty over a small island and distant island, inhabited only by natives, cannot be 
expected to be frequent.”66  International tribunals have followed this reasoning since Huber’s decision.  They 
have not required a showing of effective occupation of corpus but rather a more symbolic occupation.67  
                                                                                                                               
toward possession over the actual occupying and ruling the island.  In the case, title was ultimately 
determined by the nominal act of a French Naval Officer proclaiming the island to be French and 
publishing an article in a Honolulu newspaper.  This was deemed sufficient in creating valid title in this 
specific circumstance.  See Shaw, supra note 54, at 348. 
 
61 Id. If a non-state organ were to assert a claim for the title it would have no legal effect and would not be 
taken into consideration by any international body.  Id. at 349. 
 
62 The second element of corpus is dealt with in the Island of Palmas Case (United States vs. Netherlands), 
2 RIAA 829, 839 (Huber, Arb., April, 1928).  
 
63 Id. at 830. 
 
64 Id. at 830. The court states that elements such as tax rolls, jurisdictional legal courts, administration, civil 
servants, etc. are signs of a government’s effective occupation and control.   
 
65 The Award, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~jaysmith/Island.html (last visited February 27, 2004). 
 
66 Island of Palmas, 2 RIAA at 830-839. This is the classical notion of effective occupation.  In the exercise 
of territorial sovereignty there are necessarily gaps, intermittence in time and discontinuity in space.  This 
phenomenon will be particularly noticeable in the case of colonial territories that are only partly 
uninhabited.  The fact that a State cannot prove or display sovereignty over an uninhabited portion of 
territory cannot forthwith be interpreted as showing sovereignty is nonexistent.  Each case must be 
appreciated in accordance with the particular circumstances. Id at 833-839. 
 
67 Matthew M. Ricciardi, Title to the Aouzou Strip: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 17 Yale J. Int’l L. 301, 
385 (1992).   
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Examples of symbolic, rather than effective, occupation include such functions are having a viable police force,68 
granting of hunting concessions in a disputed area,69 and regulating fishing in claimed maritime areas.70   
Because the Marouini River tract was claimed by both Suriname and French Guiana  (both satisfying the 
intent element),71 an analysis to determine title will hinge upon the extent to which actual control, or corpus, 
could be demonstrated.  The Dutch argument, that the corpus element was fulfilled through the escaped slaves 
who inhabited the area while they were subjects of The Netherlands, has questionable appeal. Relevant case law 
determines occupation to be acts which a state traditionally performs, not acts that subjects of the area might 
perform to escape from the government itself.  As the escaped slaves received no benefit of protection, paid no 
taxes, and sought no governance from the Dutch Guiana authorities, this argument cannot be substantiated by 
the applicable case law.   
The corpus element must elucidate a consistent and effective occupation of the area, so that the intent of the 
occupier is to incorporate the area into the national identity and structure of the society.  Adhering to this 
definition French Guiana has a more persuasive argument based upon their present and actual control over the 
area.  Throughout the later decades of the Dutch colonial enterprise in the disputed land, and since its 
independence, there has been no evidence that Suriname has entered the area.   
 B. The Terra Nullius Principle in the Marouini River Tract 
 
A critical issue in determining sovereignty over an area during the colonial experience is establishing 
whether the land was “terra nullius,” defined as “the land of no one.”72  This means that such land could only be 
open for occupation if no one else was occupying it.   Suriname or France may attempt to counter an argument 
by the opposing state, asserting that either former colonial government did not effectively occupy the disputed 
areas because it was not open for occupation.  That is, the Marouini River Tract was either inhabited by another 
European power or by a cohesive indigenous society. Thus, it could not have been controlled by a colonial 
entity determined by the elements of fundamental occupation.   
                                                 
68 Southern Boundary of the Territory of Walfisch Bay (Great Britain v Germany), 104 Brit & Foreign St. 
Pap. 50, 100 (May 23, 1911). 
 
69 See Eastern Greenland, supra note 59 at 45-46.  
 
70 See Island of Palmas, 2 RIAA at 17. 
 
71 Both France and Suriname can argue that they have claimed the area through either the original grants 
given by the European sovereigns to the area or by their own actions of incorporating the area into maps, 
professing intent to occupy the area, granting gold concessions, or encouraging development of the 
Marouini River Tract.  Although these acts are relevant to establish the animus domini aspect of gaining 
title, they do not, by themselves, create title.  Both requirements of intent and corpus must be established.  
For a general discussion see Fiore, generally, supra note 52. 
 
72 See Shaw supra note 54 at 354. 
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Throughout the colonial era European scholars agreed that “any land that was terra nullius was open to 
occupation.”73  This was the justification for the colonization of North and South America, Australia, and in 
some instances, Africa.74  In the colonial era, terra nullius was seen as any part of the Earth’s surface that was 
not yet occupied by a central, developed government.75  However, to define “governing presence” and “central 
government” poses certain problems.  The majority of scholars agreed that non-European, but still cohesive 
governments, such as China, Japan, and Turkey had claim to their inhabited lands, not qualifying as terra 
nullius.76  These non-Western cultures may not, it was argued, have achieved the developmental level of 
European powers, but were still central and organized enough to maintain title over their inhabited territory.77   
 
There was debate, however, as to how much an indigenous people had to be “developed” before they also 
could be considered the inhabitants of the territory.    Whether a land was considered terra nullius depended on 
the European view of whether the inhabitants had achieved a sufficient level of development.78  The early 
Twentieth Century Italian jurist, Pasquale Fiore, stated that title to territory could be established if the area was 
inhabited by “savage tribes” yet required a treaty of cession from the tribes, no matter how slight, that these 
tribes recognized colonial rule.79  This “disguised form of conquest”80 required the European settlers to negotiate 
                                                 
73 See Ricciardi, supra note 579 at 395. 
 
74 Minquier and Ecrehos Case (France v U.K.) 1953 ICJ 47, 65-66 (Special Agreement of Nov. 17) 
 
75 See Shaw, supra note 54 at 355.  The Australian case of Mabo v. State of Queensland dealt with terra 
nullius in Australia when dealing with an indigenous population that was not organized, coherent nor 
central.  “(w)hatever differences of opinion there may have been among jurists, the state practice of the 
[colonisation period] indicates that territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political 
organization were not regarded as terra nullius.” See Mabo v State of Queensland (1992) 66 ALJR 408.   
 
76 A minority of scholars believed that if any substantive population inhabited an area that land could not be 
terra nullius.  See M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW pp 11-20 (1926), J. WESTLAKE CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW pp 141-142 (1926). 
 
77 In the Lotus instance, France brought suit against the Turkish Government claiming that it had violated 
its jurisdiction by adjudicating a collision in the Mediterranean.  It is assumed that because France brought 
suit against Turkey, the colonial power of France assumed Turkey to be a cohesive political unit.  See 
France v. Turkey, Case of the SS Lotus , PCIJ (1927), 131.   
 
78 Terra nullius was dealt with recently by the International Court of Justice in The Indo-Pakistan Western 
Boundary Case Tribunal.  February 19, 1968. Both India and Pakistan submitted evidence of partial claims 
to a border area that was primarily wasteland, yet neither submitted evidence that they claimed the entire 
area.  In deciding this case, the justices asserted that since both countries understood that the land was 
there, yet could not and did not exert influence over the territory does not qualify the areas as terra nullius.  
Conversely, it can be inferred that terra nullius is the land which although may be inhabited, must be 
unclaimed by any power, European or otherwise. 
 





a cession of title which could include direct and indirect means for inducing the indigenous inhabitants to yield 
territory to European colonialism.81 
In the Western Sahara case (1975), the International Court of Justice held that territories inhabited by tribes 
or peoples having social and political organization were not regarded as terra nullius.  In such cases sovereignty 
could not be acquired solely by occupying the territory.  It was necessary in such cases to reach agreements with 
local rulers. Such agreements were regarded as derivative roots of title, and not original titles obtained by 
occupation of terra nullius.82 
Neither the Dutch nor the French colonists had systematically explored the interior of the Marouini River 
Tract.   Historical documents which describe the area and its inhabitants are contradictory. No scientific 
expeditions were convened until 1840, and even then, there were discrepancies in their findings. Those that seem 
consistent are, at best, incomplete.   Early records indicate that Dutch traders went inland up to two hundred 
miles, yet were confined to the waterways and tributaries of major rivers.   
 
    a. Abandonment of Claims Reverting to Terra Nullius.   
The paucity of records accurately describing the Marouini River Tract raises abandonment issues.  If a state 
abandons a territory after acquiring it, that territory reverts back to terra nullius.  International law, however, is 
unsettled as to what objective acts determine abandonment.  The question is crucial because it could potentially 
be argued by either Suriname or French Guyana that the other party had occupied the area and subsequently 
abandoned it.   
The majority of scholars state that to find a territory effectively abandoned, both physical abandonment and 
the desertion of intent to occupy must occur.83  Jurists have, however, allowed exceptions.  For example, when 
an uprising occurs that drives government forces from a particular area, it is considered abandonment only if the 
government fails to return in sufficient time even when conditions otherwise permit the return.84 If, on the other 
hand, general withdrawal from an area occurs without force, abandonment would be seen if the government does 
not return after a sufficient length of time, even if it expresses the intention to return at some future date.85 
Abandonment is relevant because there is no question that the original French colonialists who were granted 
the area in question, subsequently left it.  The colonialists attempted to inhabit the area of the Marouini River 
                                                 
81 Id. 
 
82 See Western Sahara Case 1975 ICJ 12, 43 para. 92 (Advisory Opinion of October 16), and Minquier and 
Ecrehos Case (France v UK) 1953 ICJ 47, 65-66 (Special Agreement of November 17).  The doctrines of 
adverse possession and prescription are similar in that they reward a party in equity, reflecting the actual 
occupier of the land.  See specifically the Western Sahara, para. 92. 
 
83 See Ricciardi, supra note 67 at 407. 
 
84 See M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL 





Tract and after living in it for under a year, returned to the coastal cities of Kouro and Cayenne.  Because the 
state did not attempt to re-enter the land for a significant amount of time, a reversion to terra nullius was created. 
This meant Suriname would have been free to occupy the area.   Once terra nullius has been reestablished, either 
state would have been able to enter the area, upon demonstrating the applicable twin elements of fundamental 
occupation (intent and corpus). 
 
b. Terra Nullius and the Extent of Occupied Territory 
 
When a nation occupies a territory that is either uninhabited or inhabited by people supposedly not 
developed enough for self-governance, one other consideration becomes a factor under the principle of terra 
nullius.  At issue is the question of how much of the land would be eligible for occupation.    One might argue 
that the occupying state would be limited to only that territory which it effectively occupied.  An alternative view 
is that a country is entitled to control not only the land to which it has effective title, but also some adjacent 
territory, a hinterland.86  This theory claims that non-occupied hinterlands may be attached to occupied colonial 
possessions when one of three factors occurs.  These are geographical proximity, natural features, or strategic 
need.87  The argument is that adjacent lands are necessary to make the title viable.  
In the first consideration in hinterland theory, geographical continuity is used in the claim to unoccupied 
adjacent territory.  However, jurists stated that proximity alone could not support valid title unless the adjacent 
land is effectively occupied. They argued that if proximity conferred upon a state superior faculties for 
occupying a territory, that the state should exercise those faculties.  When Judge Max Huber made the Island of 
Palmas award, he concluded that contiguity alone to claim title had “no foundation in international law.”88  
Huber wrote that this principle is “by its very nature…uncertain.”89  It conflicted with the clear requirement in 
international law of effective occupation, Huber stated.  If the Hinterland theory is the basis of the claim, he 
concluded, any displays of occupation by a disputing party, even in rare or isolated instances, would defeat a 
claim that the land has contiguity with the occupied territory. 90   
                                                 
86 Hinterland as used in this context applies to territory that, while known to the colonial or administering 
power, is not effectively controlled under western notions of territorial sovereignty.  See Ricciardi, supra 








90 Id.  Fiore argues that the extent of occupied land must extend to “areas which the occupying state has 
granted the use, under private title to individuals.”  See Fiore supra note 57 at 426.  Fiore argues implicitly 
that the showing of effective control will defeat hinterland claims and that a European colonial power in 
extending title to territory must indeed assert the intent to occupy the territory and the actual occupation of 
that territory. Id. at 426-427. 
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The second basis for claiming unoccupied adjacent land in the Hinterland theory pertains to natural 
geographic features.  Claims could be invoked, according to this reasoning, based on geographical contiguity 
extending to a natural boundary.  Prominent natural features such as oceans, mountains and rivers create natural 
boundaries that allow for clear demarcation and division of borders.  The 1899 Paris Arbitration, reaffirmed this 
view when it dealt with border disputes between British Guiana and Venezuela.91  Britain wanted to claim title to 
adjacent lands and to use the natural boundaries to divide Guyana and Venezuela because they are “both easy to 
distinguish and hard to cross.”92  Britain also asserted hinterland theories based on ethnic and racial divisions.  
Yet, Pasquale Fiore, the Italian jurist declared that even in cases where there existed linguistic, ethnic and 
geographical consistency with the hinterland, international law has always stated that the claiming state must 
effectively occupy the territory within a reasonable time.93 
A third basis upon which to claim title to lands adjacent to occupied territories under the hinterland theory is 
to show that the area is needed for the safety and security of the state.  Great Britain claimed at the 1885 
Conference of Berlin that when settlements are reached in territorial disputes it has the right also to assume  
sovereignty over any adjacent uninhabited territory which is needed to maintain the settlement’s integrity and 
viability.94  The British claim did not gain much support from within the international community, however, and 
international tribunals and panels did not use the hinterland theory in subsequent rulings.  According to Pasquale 
Fiore, “hinterlands may find application in connection with possessions acquired by conquest, colonial 
protectorate, or by means of spheres of influence, but [hinterlands] does not constitute a legitimate mode of 
acquisition.”95 
International tribunals would most likely grant title to the unoccupied adjacent lands if no other state is also 
claiming the same land as its hinterland.  In this case the title would be awarded only when one of the claimants 
demonstrates actual occupation.96  For example, Denmark had settled some coastal ports and then claimed 
additional, uninhabited, lands in Eastern Greenland under the hinterland claim.  No other nation challenged this 
                                                 
91 Clifton J. Child.  The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration, 44 Am. J. Int’l L. 682 (1951); see 
also William Cullen Dennis, Editorial Comment, The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Arbitration of 
1899, 44 Am. J. Int’l L. 720 (1951). 
 
92 See Ricciardi, supra note 67 at 407.  The natural boundary theory was discussed in the Hanish Island 
Award between Yemen and Eritrea in dealing with a group of Islands in the Red Sea.  The Yemeni 
pleadings describe the islands as being contained within the same “principle of natural or geophysical 
unity.”  The International Arbitral Panel asserted that this natural boundary theory is “not an absolute 
principle.”  See Hanish Island Arbitration Phase I: Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of Dispute. Chapter 
X Conclusions Paragraph 461  
 
93 See Fiore, supra note 57,  
 
94 Telegram from Lord Granville to Sir Edward Malet (Jan. 14, 1885). Discussed in Ricciardi, supra note 
62 at 407-409. 
 
95 See Fiore, supra note 57 at 430. 
 
96 See Eastern Greenland, supra note 59 at para. 46 
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claim or sought to occupy the territory.  As a result the area became recognized internationally as Danish.  It 
occurred solely on the basis of Danish domestic legislation decreeing control over the territory, with no other 
evidence of the actual display of sovereignty.  
 In framing the Eastern Greenland decision, the Court considered whether some other power was claiming 
sovereignty over the territory in question.97 An important factor in the decision reached by the Court was that no 
other state had made any claim to the Eastern Greenland territory before 1931; nor had any other state even 
disputed the Danish claim to the territory.98  Thus, even though Denmark had made only scant acts of 
occupation, these acts were deemed sufficient to be granted title because this Arctic territory was so remote and 
virtually inaccessible and because there were no competing claims99 
In one respect the hinterland may be seen as the extension of the plantation system.  The plantations 
obtained many of their needed commodities from the hinterland areas and some of the military assistance needed 
to maintain them.  However, even though there was always a close relationship between the plantation and the 
hinterland, the hinterland also produced goods for export to Europe.100  France and The Netherlands received 
many of these products and might have argued that this commercial relationship helps sustain a claim of 
territorial sovereignty over these lands.      
A hinterland claim would be equally beneficial for Suriname or French Guiana because it could, if it is to be 
acknowledged by any deciding tribunal, ‘attach’ the Marouini River Tract to the colonial entities.  France could 
argue that the area is part of the same “geographic contiguity” of its colony, and likewise, Suriname could argue 
that the Marouini River Tract was necessary to protect against escaped slaves from escaping to French Guiana.  
However, the likelihood that a hinterland theory could play a significant role in deciding the Marouini River 
Tract dispute is small.  The debate will most likely hinge upon the showing of modern elements of effective 
occupation. 
  
c.  Acquisition of Title Through Prescription 
 
The acquisition of title to a territory through the intent element and the corpus element forms of occupation 
was possible only when no other state had previously perfected title to it.  Several other means of obtaining the 
                                                 




99 This case is confirmed and contrasted by the Island of Palmas, where it states explicitly that hinterland 
theories of state sovereignty are not valid when they compete with another nation’s claim to the same 
territory. It is possible to reconcile the two countries by noting the extreme isolation of Greenland 
experienced by in Denmark as contrasted to the Island of Palmas, which contained various population 
centers that were intermittently inhabited. See Isle of Palmas at 129.  Eastern Greenland is then considered 
the first international al arbitral award to sanction hinterland possession in the absence of conflicting 
claims.  In these rare instances, it is therefore possible to claim large tracts of hinterland territories with 
small acts of occupation.  Id 
 
100 ALVIN THOMPSON, COLONIALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN GUYANA 1580-1803. 175 (1987). 
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territory exists when that land is controlled by one state.  One such mechanism, that is relevant to the Marouini 
River Tract dispute, is by gaining title through prescription.  Prescription is defined as “legitimization of a 
doubtful title by the passage of time and the presumed acquiescence of the former sovereign.”101  Analogous to 
the common law property term of “adverse possession,” prescription typically requires the same conditions.  The 
adverse possession has to be accomplished and disclosed publicly and conspicuously.  It must also be notorious 
and continuous (without interruption) for a “reasonable period of time.”102 This possession must not be contested 
or challenged by the original possessor.103   And finally, to gain title by prescription, the intruding elements must 
be part of a nation-state.   
  Jurists have described prescription as de facto possession of a territory.  Under this theory, if possession 
was known to be illegitimate from the beginning, but if established and maintained for a “considerable number 
of years,” creates good title to the occupied land.104  For example, in the Botswana/Namibia dispute, title cannot 
be perfected by non-state actors (private citizens) encroaching upon sovereign territory.  In both instances of 
prescription and terra nullius, the outcome is similar.  The state constructively occupying the territory maintains 
sovereignty. 
The requirement for a reasonable amount of time is imprecise, other than the “considerable number of 
years” specification.  Determining a proper time frame will depend, in each case, on the competing claims, the 
nature of the dispute, and the circumstances involved in deciding the title to the area.  In any case, the 
requirement has gained little judicial review.105 One of the few international cases that considered this element 
of prescription was the Minquier and Ecrehos case.106 The case was a dispute between France and England over 
several small islands in the English Channel.  The court concentrated primarily on those acts of prescription that 
took place within the past 100 years, even though titles to these lands could be traced back to medieval times 107 
                                                 
101 See Shaw, supra note 54 at 343-344. 
 
102  Prescription is dealt with in three major international awards.  The Clipperton Island Arbitration 
(France v Mexico) (1932) 26 AJIL 390; Western Sahara, 1975 ICJ at 43 para. 92; and Minquier and 
Ecrehos, 1953 ICJ at para. 65-66.  The doctrines of adverse possession and prescription are similar in that 
they reward a party in equity, reflecting the actual occupier of the land.  See specifically the Western 
Sahara, 1975 ICJ at 43 para. 92. 
 
103 The reasonable amount of time and the objection of the state are considered in two major awards.   See 
Eastern Greenland Case supra note 54 at 45-46; Western Sahara 1975 ICJ at 42-43 para. 91.  The type of 
encroachment needed to manifest sovereignty is analogous to the terra nullius requirements of animus 
domini and corpus.  See Minquiers and Ecrehos 1953 ICJ at 47; and Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case 
(United Kingdom v Norway) 1951 ICJ 116, 184 (Judgment of December 18). 
 
104 See Fiore, supra note 57 at 428. 
 
105 Id. at 345. 
 





Both Suriname and French Guiana could offer arguments in their territorial dispute under the prescription 
theory.   French Guiana could argue that it had effectively occupied the territory and thus demonstrated animus 
corpus and intent to occupy for decades, certainly meeting the “reasonable amount of time” criteria, no matter 
what the Dutch had claimed earlier.  On the other hand, Suriname could maintain that even though French 
Guiana effectively demonstrated animus corpus and intent element throughout the colonial era, the colonial 
government in France ignored a conspicuous encroachment onto the disputed territory.   
The issue would then center on whether the French government in Paris objected to Suriname’s apparent 
encroachment. France might argue that no objection was needed because the encroachment from Dutch 
Guianese and later Surinamese people were as individuals rather than as an official activity of state.    
Suriname’s counter argument could state that, while it encouraged private individuals to enter the disputed area, 
it also maintained military troops and outposts in the area. Suriname thus fulfills the requirement for an official 
function of state, not by its people but its military in the area.  Through a prescription argument, Suriname could 
in theory gain title to the Marouini River Tract simultaneously with French Guiana demonstrating intent to 
occupy the land.   
 
 d. Suriname’s Claims under Acquiescence and Estoppel  
 
Suriname’s claims to the disputed territory might also be thwarted by the doctrines of acquiescence and 
estoppel.  When the French began to occupy the territory, presumably with the full knowledge of the Dutch and 
Surinamese, there was no official protestation.  In international law, acquiescence occurs where a protest is 
called for and does not happen.”108  According to Brownlie, a state’s acquiescence to the encroachment of 
territory by another state has the same effect as recognition. The only significant difference is that recognition is 
an overt, positive act by the state to show that it accepts a given situation, whereas acquiescence occurs from the 
absence of protest when it might reasonably be expected.  
An intervening variable in the concept of acquiescence is the duration of time between the disputable 
actions of one state and the official protest by the other.  If there is a considerable lapse of time before an 
objection is lodged, it is understood that acceptance of the event has taken place. An example of this was in the 
Libya/Chad case.  A 1955 Treaty established some boundaries between those adjoining nations. Another Treaty 
in 1966 further extended those boundaries but did not alter the ones established previously.  The International 
Court of Justice reviewed later boundary disputes between Chad and Libya.  The Court noted, “if a serious 
dispute had indeed existed regarding frontiers, eleven years after the conclusion of the 1955 Treaty, one would 
expect it to have been reflected in the 1966 Treaty.”109  Inasmuch as neither nation had officially protested the 
                                                 
108 Id.  Brownlie asserts that recognition, estoppel, and acquiescence are not essential to gaining title over a 
disputed territory, but are of great significance to any international tribunal.  Brownlie further distinguished 
acquiescence from estoppel by saying that recognition is a more persuasive element than acquiescence.   
 
109 See Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad) 1994 ICJ REP. 6, 21-22, para. 6. 
 
 22 
agreement for eleven years, the Court ruled that the nations had acquiesced to the conditions that had existed in 
1966.   
Once a state has acquiesced to the encroachment by another party onto the territory it had claimed, the 
opportunity to revert to the previous condition is prevented by estoppel.  The notion of estoppel states if one 
party has already acquiesced to the actions of the other party, then there can be no further dispute about it 
during subsequent arbitration hearings.   An example in which estoppel precluded the wishes of one party to 
revisit an issue that had been previously settled through acquiescence occurred in a dispute between Cambodia 
and Thailand. In the Temple of Preah Vihear110 case it was revealed that boundary commissioners had 
negotiated an agreement between Thailand and Cambodia’s colonial ruler, France, and issued a demarcation of 
their boundary. However, during these negotiations, the Thai prince visited a temple that was in disputed 
territory.  A French flag was hanging very visibly over the temple and the prince made no objection or 
declaration that a flag of Thailand should be flying there instead or in addition to the French flag.  Based on his 
conduct, which may have been due to simple politeness or an unwillingness to cause a scene on a holy site, it 
was no longer possible to dispute the possession of this territory.    
In the same way, Suriname’s acquiescence to the French control of the area precludes subsequent 
argument about French sovereignty over that territory.  Whatever intentions they might have had, Suriname 
allowed and even relied on French Guiana to administer the disputed lands.   Had Suriname planned to assert 
effective control over the area when it was within their means to do, their intention was negated when the French 
Guianese moved in without Suriname’s timely protest. Suriname’s intention to inhabit the area would thereafter 
be in conflict with the actual French occupation.  Actual control by the French, from the colonial era to the 
Twenty-First Century, indicates that any arbitration panel would likely support maintenance of the status quo.     
 
 
 e.  Suriname’s Claims Under The Uti Possidetis Doctrine  
 
The foundation of any claim by Suriname to the Marouini River Tract rests on the doctrine of uti possidetis.   
This doctrine states that when a country achieves its independence from a colonial ruler it acquires all the land 
and original borders that had comprised the former colony.111   Moreover, says this doctrine, if the colony and its 
                                                 
110 The Temple of Preah Vihear.  ICJ Reports 1962, p. 6, 33 ILR, p. 48.  See also D. H. Johnson, The Case 
Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear 11 ILCQ, 1962 , p. 1183.   The dissent by Judge Spender in the 
Temple of Preah Vihear asserts that there must be a higher degree of acquiescence and recognition for a 
party to be estopped from raising protests. Id. pp. 142-146.  The Temple of Preah Vihear opinion on 
recognition in international law was later confirmed by Queen Elizabeth II in her ruling between Argentina 
and Chile.  See Award of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II for the Arbitration of a Controversy between the 
Argentine Republic and the Republic of Chile. (1966). Argentina-Chile Frontier Case, RIAA, Vol. 16 
(1969) 109-182. See also R.Y. Jennings The Argentine-Chile Boundary Dispute: A Case Study, printed in 
SIR FRANCIS VALLIT, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES THE LEGAL ASPECTS 315 (1972). 
 
111 Steven R. Ratner Drawing a Better Line:  Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States 90 AJIL 590 
(1996).  See also Michael Reisman, International Decision:  The Government of the State of Eritrea and the 
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ruler nation were involved in an unresolved border dispute with a neighbor of that colony, the newly independent 
nation inherits the dispute.112  The territory that is claimed by both nations remains unresolved;  the only change 
is that the former colonial ruler no longer has any involvement in the issue.   
For example, the International Court of Justice dealt with uti possidetis in the Case Concerning the Frontier 
Dispute (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali).113 Here, the court held that uti possidetis was firmly established in 
international law whenever aspects of decolonization are at issue.114  The administrative delimitations that were 
established during colonial times were applied to international frontiers whenever decolonization occurs.115 
In South America the doctrine of uti possidetis was applied when many of the former colonies of Spain and 
Portugal were gaining independence.116  Most prominently the doctrine helped fix some borders of Brazil when 
it gained its independence from Portugal, and in Venezuela when it became autonomous from Spain.117  
Any arbitration authority that adheres to a strict interpretation of this doctrine would not likely conclude that 
the dispute is resolved under uti possidetis.  That is, neither Suriname nor French Guiana could bolster their 
respective claim to the Marouini River Tract using this doctrine.  Because the border dispute was not resolved 
during the colonial rule, the subsequent independence of Suriname from The Netherlands does not bolster its 
claim against France or its colony in French Guyana.   
Uti possidetis118 should not be confused with a similar principle, usually known as the doctrine of state 
succession.119  State succession occurs when a bi-lateral agreement is reached and a treaty is signed authorizing 
                                                                                                                               
Government of the Republic of Yemen.  Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the 
Proceedings, (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute) 93 AJIL 688 July 1999. 
 
112 Catharine A Hartzenbusch Recent Development:  International Litigation: Land, Island, and Maritime 
Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras) Gen No. 75, 1992 I.C.J. (Judgment of Sept. 11) (Nicaragua 
Intervening, 34 Harv. Int’l L.J. 21 (1993).   
 
113 See Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali) at 557. 
 
114 Id. at 570.   
 
115 Id. at 565. 
 
116 CHRISTIANE SIMMLER  DAS UTI POSSIDETIS PRINZIP:  ZUR GRENZZIEHUNG ZWISCHEN NEU 
ENTSTANDENEN STAATEN. 276 (1999).  See also the Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v Mali) [1986] 
ICJ 545, paras. 19-26.  EC Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia (1993) 92 ILR 162.  Also seen in the 
Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras), 1992, pp. 
351, 598; 97 ILR, pp. 266, 514. 
 
117 See Simmler, supra note 96 at 47. uti possidetis- principle was recognized Vienna Convention on the 
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties 1978, which provides that treaties establishing boundaries are an 
exception to the general rule that successor States start with a clean slate in respect of treaties entered into 
by their predecessors. Id. 
 
118 Uti possidetis translates to “as you possess, so you may possess.” See Shaw, supra note 54 at 676.  
 
119 See Shaw, supra note 54 at 676.  State succession is dealt with in Article 2 of both the Vienna 
Conventions of 1978 and 1983 and Opinion No. 1 of the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission, 92 ILR, pp. 
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one state to displace another in the designated territory.120  State succession differs from uti possidetis in that 
state succession does not directly apply to international boundaries of the successor state.  The doctrine of uti 
possidetis, in these instances, refers directly to the inheritance of boundaries at state succession from 
colonialism.121   
  
 
f.  Two Types of Uti Possidetis.    
  
When a new nation is created by the relinquishment of a colonial power its borders remain the same under 
uti possidetis, but there are two distinct mechanisms to make this possible.  One mechanism is known as uti 
possidetis juris, and the other is uti possidetis de facto.122  In the juris version the boundaries of the new nation 
are defined according to the legal documents of the former colonial power at the time of independence.”123  In 
the de facto version the borders may be demarcated when territory was actually occupied and governed by the 
colonial power at the time of independence, even if it was not consistent with the colony’s legally defined 
border.  An arbitration authority must consider which of these versions of uti possidetis predominates in 
determining the Marouini River Tract dispute.   
In settling boundary disputes arising from the transfer of a colonial power to a new independent South 
American nation, courts have based their decisions on one or the other version of uti possidetis.  An example in 
which uti possidetis juris was used took place in 1922 with a border dispute between the two former Spanish 
colonies that became Colombia and Venezuela.124  The disputed land was virtually uninhabited and required 
little governance.  Inasmuch as Spain had controlled all the territory in question, there had been relatively little 
need for resolution of boundaries before the nations became autonomous. The court held that uti possidetis juris 
                                                                                                                               
162, 165.  The foremost International Court of Justice decision is Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, 83 ILR, pp. 1, 
22 and the El Salvador/Honduras case. 
 
120 Badinter Commission in Opinion No 3 in 1992 delineating the boundaries between Serbia and 
Yugoslavia.  See Peter Radam Post-Secession International Borders:  A Critical Analysis of the Opinions 
of the Badinter Commission. 24 Melbourne U. L.R. 50, April 2000.    
 






124 Honduras Borders (Guatemala v Honduras) (1933) 2 RIAA 1307, 1322. Examples of treaties 
stipulating the application of uti possidetis include: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 30 
August 1855, Argentine Confederation-Chile, 113 333, art 39; Treaty between Columbia and Venezuela for 
the Arbitration of the Boundary, 14 September 1881, 159 87, art 1; Bonilla-Gomez Treaty: Border 
Demarcation Convention, 7 October 1894, Honduras-Nicaragua, 180 347, art 2(4); Treaty of Arbitration, 
30 December 1902, Bolivia-Peru, 192 289, arts 1 and 5; Treaty of Arbitration, 16 July 1930, Guatemala-
Honduras, 132 BFSP 823, art 5. In some of these cases the treaty did not specify which of the two versions 
of uti possidetis applied. 
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was the deciding principle.  The Court stated that, under this principle, the Colombia-Venezuela boundaries 
would be the same as those of the Spanish provinces they were succeeding.  The Court also noted that even 
though the territories were not occupied in fact, they were considered, by common agreement, “as being 
occupied in law.” 125    
An example in which the other version, uti possidetis de facto, influenced a court finding occurred in a 
dispute between the neighboring Central American nations of Honduras and El Salvador.  Both countries had 
been small provinces of Spain before gaining independence.  Unlike the situation in the Colombia-Venezuela 
boundary resolution, the land in dispute between El Salvador and Honduras had been highly populated.  Even 
though this territory had fallen within the borders of one province the rulers of the other province had long 
governed the people within.  The Court used the uti possidetis de facto version in its ruling.  It held that new 
borders might be demarcated by territory that was actually occupied and governed by the former colonial ruler 
when it became independent, “irrespective of the legal definition of former colonial borders.”126   
An important factor for the International Court of Justice in reaching its decision was that El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Spain, were all signatories to the international treaties that determined the applicable law. As 
such, the International Court of Justice would support any agreements made between them.  Therefore, the Court 
held that the borders could be changed despite uti possidetis juris if both parties were in agreement.127   In other 
words, a state could claim only territory that it already occupied and governed (uti possidetis de facto) if both 
disputants agreed that the former colonial borders were no longer binding on the newly independent countries.   
The decision about the Marouini River Tract dispute would first need to decide which type of uti possidetis 
predominates.  Suriname’s case would be bolstered if  uti possidetis juris version prevails.  French Guiana would 
have a stronger case under possidetis de facto.   
Thus, Suriname might argue that the boundary line should be set at the western side of the contested 
territory, at  the Itany River.  Its claim is based on uti possidetis juris, because the Itany River was the recognized 
border during its colonial times and when Suriname gained independence from the Netherlands it inherited this 
border.  Through this mechanism, a state successor of colonialism is entitled to inherit the original corpus and 
                                                 
125 Colombia-Venezuela Arbitration UNRIAA 223, at p. 288 (1922).  The court upheld the concept of uti 
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127 Alan J. Day, Border and Territorial Disputes 378 - 382 (1982).   The application of uti possidetis goes 
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intent of its colonial predecessor.  This would allow Suriname to argue that the activities of Dutch Guiana in the 
area  established intent through the colonial period.  Inasmuch as Dutch Guiana established some military 
outposts in the area to help them intimidate and apprehending their escaped slaves, and because some of those 
slaves lived in the Tract while subjects of the colony, Dutch Guiana showed intent to occupy this territory.  
Suriname could argue that the Dutch and Dutch Guiana government thereby established intent at least during the 
early to mid colonial era.  Suriname could conclude its argument stating that this early intent of possession 
precluded French Guiana from perfecting title to the area by its possession throughout the Twentieth Century. 
Conversely, France and French Guiana might argue that the boundary line at the eastern side of the 
disputed territory on the Marouini River should be uncontested. Its claim would be based on uti possidetis de 
facto, because of the reality that French Guiana has occupied and governed the area for at least the past century.   
The French argument of uti possidetis de facto is based on the fact that it actually possesses and governs this 
territory.  As such, French Guiana is entitled to offer its evidentiary claim of consistent and effective control over 
the area.  It can also argue, even more persuasively, that this effective control is modern and current.   French 
Guiana could further argue that Dutch activity in the area, even during the slave-holding era, is not persuasive 
evidence of constructive occupation. The slaves were not settling the area of their own volition as Dutch citizens 
and the outposts were not established to help settle the area but only to keep more slaves from living in the area.   
The French argument might also refer to the Island of Palmas case in which a clear demonstration of effective 
control and constructive occupation defeats a title solely predicated upon the element of intent, either actual or 




Given the dearth of meaningful diplomatic activity, the Marouini River Tract dispute seems destined to 
remain unresolved for the foreseeable future.  Resolution will certainly not be achieved  through the current 
regimes of President Runaldo Ronaldo Venetiaan of Suriname and Jacques Chirac of France.  Even though French 
Guiana strongly supports the Chirac administration, President Chirac has not been involved in the issues of French 
Guiana.  The people of France show little interest or concern and the French media has given the issue virtually no 
attention in recent years. French Guiana wants to maintain its relationship with France and to remain part of the 
Overseas Department of France.128  While the Marouini River Tract remains within their effective control France 
and French Guiana have little motivation to seek changes.  
On the other hand, Suriname would have more incentive for bringing the issue to arbitration, if it ever 
hopes to regain effective control over the area.  However, Suriname has its hands full, on the opposite side of the 
country, in boundary disputes with its western neighbor, Guyana (formerly British Guiana).  Nearly the entire 
border between Guyana and Suriname, from Brazil to the Caribbean, is under dispute.  If all of Guyana’s claims to 
Suriname lands were sustained, Suriname would lose one-third of its entire nation to Guyana, including the 
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continental shelf.129    Moreover, the territory that those two nations are disputing has the potential of vast natural 
resources, including huge oil deposits.  In February 2004, both Suriname and Guyana have decided to place their 
dispute before the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).130 The effort to litigate this 
territorial dispute, with so much at stake, leaves Suriname with little time or resource to do anything about The 
Marouini River Tract.    
The actual economic value of the Marouini River Tract has not been thoroughly determined, and what has 
been explored thus far has not excited anyone.  Several large corporations seeking oil, lumber, and mineral 
deposits have ceased or limited their activities.  They have indicated concern about the difficult terrain and long 
distances between the area and population and shipping centers, which suggested unpromising profit margins.     
It is within this framework that a conclusive demarcation can and should be made.  It is exceedingly 
difficult, costly, and disruptive to establish new borderlines when the area in dispute is well populated, developed, 
and economically valuable.  The time to make final demarcations is before population, development and wealth 
become part of the area.  Therefore, the most propitious time for settling the Marouini River Tract is the present.  
Suriname and French Guiana should consider the present time, when the stakes and costs are relatively low, as the 
most opportune movement to seek a settlement.  If bi-lateral solutions fail, then either government should forward 
the issue to a respected international tribunal that would follow existing rules of procedure and substantive law.   
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2004.  Available at http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20040225T210000-
0500_56272_OBS_GUYANA_TAKES_SURINAME_TO_COURT___.asp (Last visited 
February 27, 2004). 
 28 
 
